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THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY" OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By HOWARD JAY GRAHAMt
"No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws."
SECTION 1, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
IN AN argument before the Supreme Court of the United States in
1882' Roscoe Conkling, a former member of the Joint Congressional
Committee which in 1866 drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, produced
for the first time the manuscript journal of the Committee, and by
means of extensive quotations and pointed comment conveyed the im-
pression that he and his colleagues in drafting the due process and equal
protection clauses intentionally used the word "person" in order to in-
clude corporations. "At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied," he declared, "individuals and joint stock companies were appealing
for congressional and administrative protection against invidious and
discriminating State and local taxes. One instance was that of an express
company, whose stock was owned largely by citizens of the State of
New York . . . " The unmistakable inference was that the Joint
Committee had taken cognizance of these appeals and had drafted its
text with particular regard for corporations.
Coming from a man who had tAvice declined a seat on the Supreme
Bench,2 who spoke from first hand knowledge, and who submitted a
manuscript record in support of his stand, so dramatic an argument
could not fail to make a profound impression. Within the next few
years the Supreme Court began broadening its interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and early in 1886 it unanimously affirmed
Conkling's proposition, namely that corporations were "persons" within
the meaning of the equal protection clause.' It is literally true therefore
,Research Fellow in Political Science, University of California.
1. See San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific MR, 116 U. S. 138. A printed
copy of the Oral Argument of Roscoe Conkling is preserved in a volume entitled S4U
MATEO CASE, ARGu-ENTS AND DEcasioNs, in the Hopkins Railroad Collection of the
Library of Stanford University. It is this copy 'which the author has used, and vhich
he cites hereafter as CoNxLING's ARGUMENT.
2. Once as Chief Justice, vice Chase, in 1873; again as Associate Justice, vice Hunt,
in 1882. Chief Justice Waite and Justice Blatchford thus both occupied seats which had
been declined by Conkling.
3. See Waite, J., in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U. S. 394,
396 (1886). This case involved the same questions as the Son Mateo case argued three
years before.
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that Roscoe Conkling's argument sounded the death knell of the narrow
"Negro-race theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment expounded by Jus-
tice Miller in the Slaughter House cases. By doing this it cleared the
way for the modern development of due process of law and the corres-
ponding expansion of the Court's discretionary powers over social and
economic legislation. Viewed in perspective, the argument is one of
the landmarks in American constitutional history, an important turning
point in our social and economic development.
Conkling's argument has figured prominently in historical writing
since 1914 when B. B. Kendrick unearthed and edited the manuscript
copy of the Journal which Conkling used in court.4 Checking the record
in the light of his major propositions, historians became convinced of the
fundamental truth of Conkling's story. Repeatedly, it appeared from
the Journal, the Joint Committee had distinguished in its drafts in the
use of the words "person" and "citizen." ' Under no circumstances
could the terms have been confused. Moreover, as the Committee had
persistently used the term "person" in those clauses which applied to
property rights and the term "citizen" in those clauses which applied
to political rights, the force of this distinction seemed plain: corporations
as artificial persons, had indeed been among the intended beneficiaries of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Convinced on this point, historians devel-
oped an interesting theory: the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment
had assumed something of the character of a conspiracy, with the due
process and equal protection clauses inserted as double entendres. Labor-
ing ostensibly in the interests of the freedmen and of the "loyal white
citizens of the South," the astute Republican lawyers who made tip the
majority of the Committee had intentionally used language which gave
corporations and business interests generally increased judicial protection
as against State legislatures.
4. THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT CommTrTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTUCTIoN (1914),
The Journal itself is printed in Part I, pp. 37-129. The "Introduction," pp. 17-36,
gives an interesting account of its history and the circumstances of discovery. It is
revealed that 6,000 copies of the Journal were printed by the order of the Senate in
February, 1884 (while the San Mateo case was still before the Supreme Court). For
some unexplained reason these copies never circulated, a single printed copy of the
edition being preserved in the Government Printing Office. This copy was used by
Horace E. Flack in the preparation of his monograph, THE ADopTIoN OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1908). But it was not until 1911 and the publication of Hannis
Taylor's THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMEmICAN CONSTITUTION (1911), wherein
attention was directed to Conkling's argument, that the full historical importance of
the manuscript was noted. It should be added that Professor Kendrick was concerned
with the bearing of the Journal on matters pertaining to Reconstruction, and referred
only incidentally to the later use made by Conkling. This fact explains the failure to
note the discrepancies in Coniding's quotations from the Journal.
5. KENDRICK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 50-51, 56, 60-61 for striking examples.
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What appeared to be corroboration for this viewpoint was presently
found in the speeches 6 of Representative John A. Bingham, the Ohio
Congressman and railroad lawyer who almost alone of the members of
the Joint Committee had been responsible for the phraseology of Section
One. Bingham, it appeared both from the Journal and the debates on
the floor of the House, had at all times shown a zealous determination
to secure to "all persons" everywhere "equal protection in the rights of
property."7 Moreover, he had evinced an extraordinary preference for
the due process clause and had developed and defended its phraseology
in most vigorous fashion. As no other member of the Joint Committee,
or of Congress, gave evidence of a similar desire to protect property
rights, and none manifested his partiality for the due process clause, it
seemed logical to conclude that Bingham's purposes had in fact been far
more subtle and comprehensive than was ever appreciated at the time.
Bingham had been the master-mind who "put over" this draft upon an
unsuspecting country. The fact that he had tried and failed to secure
the inclusion of a "just compensation" clause in Section One as still
another restraint upon the States' powers over property,' and the fact
that in 1871,' five years after the event, he declared he had framed the
section "letter for letter and syllable for syllable" merely served to
strengthen these suspicions.
Impressed by this cumulative evidence, and alive to its historical im-
plications, Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, in 1927, developed in their
Rise of American Civilization what is still, a decade later, the most
precise statement of the conspiracy theory. Undocumented, and with
conclusions implicit rather than explicit, the Beards' thesis was this:
Bingham, "a shrewd . . . and successful railroad lawyer, . . . familiar
with the possibilities of jurisprudence," had had much broader purposes
than his colleagues. Whereas they were "bent on establishing the rights
of Negroes," he was "determined to take in the whole range of national
6. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 429, 1034, 1064-1055, 10S9-1095, 1292.
7. Originally Bingliam's draft was phrased in the positive form: "Congress shall
have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every
State within this Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property."
Later, a clause was added giving Congress power to "secure to all cifens the same
immunities and also equal political rights and privileges." These clauses were the
embryonic forms out of which the later phraseology developed. Early drafts made no
mention of "due process of law." Not until the House had virtually rejected the
Amendment on the grounds that it gave Congress too sweeping powers-thus com-
pelling a change from the early positive to the present negative form ("no State shall
. . . was the due process phraseology inserted. Bingham's early speeches reveal,
however, that he had had due process of law in mind from the very beginning.
8. Kmamsic, op. cit. supra note 4, at 85. Bingham made this attempt at the
meeting of the Committee on April 21, 1866. The adverse vote was 7 to 5, with three
members absent.
9. CoNG. IEcoRD, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) Appendix, at 83-85.
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economy." Toward this end he had drafted the due process and equal
protection clauses and forced them upon the Committee by persistent
efforts. Quoting Bingham's speeches and Conkling's argument in sup-
port of the view that corporations had been among the intended bene-
ficiaries of the draft, the authors concluded :10
"In this spirit, Republican lawmakers restored to the Constitution
- the protection for property which Jacksonian judges had whittled
away and made it more sweeping in its scope by forbidding states,
in blanket terms, to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. By a few words skillfully chosen every
act of every state and local government which touched adversely
the rights of persons and property was made subject to review and
liable to annulment by the Supreme Court at Washington."
Thus, while the Beards nowhere expressly state that Bingham was guilty
of a form of conspiracy, this is none the less a fair inference from their
account, and it is one which has repeatedly been drawn. Numerous
writers,"' accepting the Beards' account and popularizing it, have sup-
plied more explicit interpretations. Thus, E. S. Bates, in his Story of
Congress, declares that Bingham and Conkling in inserting the due
process phraseology, "smuggled" into the Fourteenth Amendment "a
capitalist joker."' 2
Despite widespread acceptance and a prestige which derives from the
Beards' sponsorship, the conspiracy theory has not gone unchallenged.
Numerous writers have expressed varying degrees of disapproval and
skepticism. 3 Constitutional historians in particular appear reluctant to
accept its implications, although they, no more than the sponsoring school
of social historians, have as yet presented thqir case in documented detail.
One thus observes the curious paradox of a theory which cuts across the
whole realm of American constitutional and economic history and which
10. Vol. II, p. 111-113 (italics added).
11. See, e.g., Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism. (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 668, 691; DAGGETT, PRINcIrEs OF INLAND TRANSPORTATiON (1934) 436-
437; JosEpHsoN, THE ROBBER BARoNs (1934) 52.
12. At 233-234.
13. Louis Boudin has referred with obvious irritation to the "legendary history
of the Fourteenth Amendment" and has threatened a monograph in disproof of "pseudo
history" sponsored by certain "eminent historians." 2 GOVENMENT BY JDICI=Y (1932)
404. More precise and dispassionate, Walton H. Hamilton has objected that the theory
"endows the captains of a rising industry with a capacity for forward plan and deep
plot which they are not usually understood to possess." Properly-Accordng to Locke
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 864, 875. Finally, E. R. Lewis, the most recent writer to examine
the matter in the light of both the published Journal and the Congressional debates,
has emerged frankly skeptical of Conkling's whole story and inclined to demand more
convincing evidence. A HIsToRY OF AMERcAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO THE WO=iD WAR (1937) 28 ff.
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is itself a subject for increasing speculation and controversy, yet which
has developed piecemeal, without systematic formulation or criticism.
How extraordinary certain aspects of this situation are may be judged
from the fact that one is now left wholly in the dark as to the nature
and degree of conspiratorial intent imputed to Bingham and his col-
leagues. Is one to believe, for example, that these men determined from
the first to devise phraseology which included corporations? Or simply
that they later perceived it possible, or advantageous, to do so? Again,
what type of protection did the framers contemplate within the meanings
of the due process phrase? Protection in the modem substantive sense?
Or simply protection against arbitrary procedure? If simply the latter
was intended, the "conspiracy" was scarcely worthy of the name, for
to have used "person" and "due process" in this manner would have been
natural for any well. informed lawyer of 1866, whatever may be said
of the understanding of the layman. On the other hand, to have applied
due process substantively with regard to corporations in 1866 would
have been a thoroughly revolutionary step, even for a lawyer. For this
reason it is a substantive usage that is most consistent with the theory.
In both of these issues the implied difference in motive is great; and
likewise the implied ambiguity in the theory. The matter of motive and
intent would seem to be too fundamental an element of conspiracy to
leave in so unsatisfactory a state.
It is the purpose of this article to re-examine the conspiracy theory and
to determine, insofar as possible, the extent to which it meets certain
essential conditions.
I. CoNKLiNGs ARGUMENT RE-EXAMINED
A priori, there are two major reasons for being skeptical of a declara-
tion that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to aid business
interests when they devised the due process and equal protection clauses.
First, as we have just seen, such a declaration virtually demands as its
major condition that John A. Bingham and the other members of the
Joint Committee regarded due process of law as a restraint upon the
substance of legislation at the early date of 1866, whereas due process
was at this time, with a few striking exceptions,14 merely a limitation
upon procedure. The theory thus presupposes that the drafters assumed
what was really an extraordinary viewpoint: it endows them with re-
14. The two most conspicuous were Chief justice Taney's dictum in the Dred
Scott case [19 Howard 393 (U. S., 1856)] and the various dicta in the New York
liquor case of Wynehanter v. People [13 N. Y. 378 (1856)]. For the development of
due processof law before the Civil War, see Howe, The Meaning of Due Process
Prior to the Adoption of the 74th Amendment (1930) 18 CALI. L. REv. 583; Corwin,
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (1911) 24 H nv. L. REV.
366, 460.
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markable insight and perspicacity. The second objection is that, as an
apparent explanation of the Committee's choice of the word "person"
in preference to "citizen," the theory ignores the fact that "person" was
really the term employed in the Fifth Amendment, the phraseology of
which Bingham simply copied. Further, in line with this last point is
the fact that "persons," as a generic term and as a device employed in
the original Constitution to refer to Negro slaves,15 clearly included
"persons" of the Negro race and may logically have been preferred for
this reason, since grave doubt existed as to whether Negroes were "citi-
zens," and troublesome problems of definition arose if one tried to speak
of them in still more precise terms.
The obstacles which these facts throw in the way of the conspiracy
theory are at once apparent. Granted that Bingham's speeches reveal a
solicitude for property rights not found in the speeches of his colleagues,
granted that his drafts of the Amendment were couched in much broader
language than those of his associates- in language which today "takes
in the whole range of national economy" -still, it hardly follows that
Bingham in 1866 was thinking of corporations as the beneficiaries of
his drafts, nor that he regarded due process in the modern substantive
sense. He may, conceivably, have used the words "any person" merely
as a sure means of including Negroes as well as whites; he may also
have used "due process of law" as a sure means of guaranteeing fair
trial and fair procedure to all natural persons. In fact, so long as these
were the prevailing usages down to 1866 one is hardly warranted in
attributing a more subtle or comprehensive purpose to Bingham without
definite, positive evidence. To do otherwise is to risk interpreting Bing-
ham's purposes in the light of subsequent events.
So long as these fundamental objections place serious obstacles in the
path of the theory, the question at once arises whether the direct state-
ments made by Conkling in 1882 are alone sufficient to sustain it. If
they are not, search must be made for new evidence, and the -whole
problem of the circumstantial materials in Bingham's speeches must be
thoroughly canvassed.
An examination of Conkling's argument properly becomes the start-
ing point of our inquiry. To facilitate later discussion, an analytical
abstract of his argument will be presented:
1. Conkling's basic proposition, inferred at the outset, was that the
Committee had had two distinct and clearly defined purposes. The first
of these "related chiefly to the freedmen of the South" and dealt with
the "subject of suffrage, the ballot, and representation in Congress."
The second was broader and far more important, namely, to frame an
15. Art. I, §2, par. 3; Art. IV, §2, par. 3.
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amendment which would secure universal protection in the rights of
life, liberty, and property."0
2. Having drawn this division in the agenda, he now declared, and
offered extensive quotations from the Journal designed to show, that
before the Committee undertook the second of these tasks -i.e., the task
of framing what later became the due process and equal protection
clauses- it had in fact "completely disposed of" and "lost all juris-
diction and power over" the first, i.e., "the portion which did in truth
chiefly relate to the freedmen of the South."'
3. His quotations from the Journal were also designed to show that
the Committee had throughout its deliberations repeatedly distinguished
between "citizens" and "persons," and that it had in general used "citi-
zens" in the clauses designed to secure political rights and privileges (i.e.,
in what later became the privileges and immunities clause) and had used
"persons" in the clause designed to secure "equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty, and property."18
4. He even quoted from the minutes to show that on one occasion
he himself had moved to strike out of a draft "citizens" and substitute
"Persons."9
5. Most important of all, he gave his listeners to understand -even
emphasized the fact - that the draft of the equal protection clause as
originally reported by a sub-committee had itself specified "citizens,"
and it is questionable, from a close reading of the argument, whether
his listeners may not have gained the impression that it was he, Conk-
ling, who had been responsible (by the previously mentioned motion)
for the substitution of "persons" for "citizens" in this clause."
6. Without laboring his point, and relying on his listeners to recall
that in the final draft of the Amendment the privileges and immunities
clause applied to "citizens," and the due process and equal protection
clauses to "persons," Conkling asked in conclusion if this record did
not show that "the Committee understood what was meant" when it
used these different terms.2'
7. Apparently to remove all doubt on this score, Conkling casually
added, "At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified . . . indi-
viduals and joint stock companies were appealing for congressional and
administrative protection against invidious and discriminating State and
16. CoixanG's AGu-sENTr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13-15.
17. Id., at 15, 19, 20. Note the inference of the modifier "which did in truth chiefly
relate." Conkling's argument abounds with such subtle suggestions of a broader and
undeclared purpose.
18. Id., at 17-19,23,24.
19. Id., at 18,19.
20. Id., at 17-19.
21. Id.,at24,25.
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local taxes" - inferring that the Committee had taken cognizance of
this situation and that a desire to protect corporations had been the
real explanation for maintaining the distinction between "citizens" and
"persons.""
Two features of Conkling's argument, which in many respects is a
masterpiece of inference and suggestion, are now to be stressed. First,
nowhere does Conkling explicitly say that the Committee regarded cor-
porations as "persons"; nowhere does he say that the members framed
the due process and equal protection clauses with corporations definitely
in mind. These are simply the casual yet unmistakable impressions gained
from dozens of hints, intimations, and distinctions made throughout his
argument. The second feature, somewhat surprising in the light of the
first, is that in his conclusion Conkling not only failed to press his points
but, on the contrary, now substantially waived them. "I have sought to
convince your honors," he said, "that the men who framed . . . the
Fourteenth Amendment must have known the meaning and force of the
term 'persons'," and in the next sentence he spoke significantly of "this
surmise."23 Later, in his peroration, he freely admitted the difficulties
of the proposition he had maintained. "The statesman," he declared,
"has no horoscope which maps the measureless spaces of a nation's life,
and lays down in advance all the bearings of its career." Finally, he
concluded in this vein, "Those who devised the Fourteenth Amendment
may have builded better than they knew . . . To some of them, the
sunset of life may have given mystical lore."2'
These quotations reveal an equivocal and indecisive element in Conk-
ling's argument, and they provoke various questions. Why, if he had
definite knowledge that the Joint Committee really framed the Amend-
ment to include corporations, did he adopt this peculiar, tenuous, and
indirect means of saying so? Why, after laboring to give the impression
of intent, did he himself at times seem to belie that impression by use
of such indecisive language? Was this simply a lawyer's caution, a
desire for understatement? Was it because he felt that suggestion might
here prove a stronger weapon than detail? Was it because he feared too
concrete an account of unwritten history might harm his cause? Or
was it because of some inherent weakness- even absence- of fact
in his argument? A critical reader must puzzle over these questions and
a cautious one will seek for tangible answers. In this connection several
tests come to mind. Does Conkling's argument bear evidence of a scrup-
ulous regard for facts, first in its major propositions, second in its
essential details? Is it inherently consistent? Does it bear evidence of
care and good faith in quotation from the Journal?
22. Id.,at 25.
23. Id.,at31 (italics added).
24. Id., at 33,34 (italics added).
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Application of these tests to the more than twenty pages of Conkling's
argument leads to some startling discoveries. Not only does it appear
as a result of such an inquiry tkat Conkling suppressed pertinent facts
and misrepresented others, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he
deliberately misquoted the Journal and even so arranged his excerpts
as to give listeners a false impression of the record and of his own
relation thereto. In framing a bill of particulars, the following may be
set down in refutation of his major points:
1. With regard to his fundamental proposition that the Joint Com-
mittee had been charged with two distinct, clearly defined purposes and
that these two purposes had at all times been kept separate and distinct,
it is sufficient to say that Conkling himself quoted"' a resolution in the
Journal which effectively disposed of his point. This resolution, intro-
duced in the Joint Committee by Senator Fessenden on January 12,
1866, reads as follows:"
"Resolved that . . . the insurgent States cahnot . . . be allowed
to participate in the Government until the basis of representation
shall have been modified, and the rights of all persons amply secured
Obviously this resolution specified two tasks for the Joint Committee.
But the important fact, not mentioned by Conkling and even disguised by
him, was that it specified both tasks with regard to the "insurgent States."
This being the case, it is hard to see how the two purposes could ever
have been "separate and distinct" in the sense which Conkling con-
tended, and harder still to believe that only those portions of the Four-
teenth Amendment relating to "representation, the suffrage," etc., dealt
exclusively with conditions in the South. The "insurgent States" refer-
ence practically destroys Conkling's case at the outset. His argument is
rendered suspect by one of his own citations from the Journal. Only
by laying emphasis upon Fessenden's use of the word "persons" in this
resolution did Conkling steer listeners past this flaw in his case.
2. Auxiliary, to his main proposition, Conkling was at great pains
to show27 that the text of Bingham's Amendment, which originally read
"Congress shall have power . . . to secure to all persons equal protection
in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property," had been dealt with by
the Committee as if members had at all times regarded it as distinct in
both subject matter and purpose from the other amendments dealing with
suffrage and representation. His particular point in tis connection was
that on January 24, 1866 the Bingham Amendment had been referred
25. Id., at 16.
26. KEm1icx, op. cit. supra note 4, at 42 (italics added). Cited hereafter as the
Fessenden resolution.
27. See note 17, supra.
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to a different sub-committee than the one that had considered the other
drafts. What Conkling neglected to say was that when Bingham origin-
ally introduced this draft on January 12, 1866, it had been referred, at
Bingham's own motion, to "the sub-committee on the basis of repre-
sentation" - the same sub-committee, in short, which received the
other drafts.28 This appears to be a damaging omission, for it suggests
that Bingham himself may have regarded his draft merely as one which,
applying to "the insurgent States," "amply secured the rights of all
persons," thus, perhaps, effectuating the second purpose outlined in the
Fessenden resolution.
Whether this last interpretation is warranted or not, failure to mention
the fact that Bingham's draft had originally been referred to the "sub-
committee on the basis of representation" led Conkling into embarrass-
ing difficulties - difficulties from which he extricated himself only by
strategem. We need here say no more than that at one point in his
argument29 Conkling quoted this passage from the Journal :20 "The Com-
mittee proceeded to the consideration of the following [i.e., Bingham]
amendment . . . proposed by the sub-committee on the basis of repre-
sentation." Obviously, to have read the text in this form would have
been to risk wiping out the very impression which he was laboring to
establish, namely that the Bingham Amendment was a thing apart, and
one dealt with by a separate sub-committee- the "sub-committee on the
powers of Congress." If we judge by his printed argument, Conkling
extricated himself from this hole by pausing after the word "sub-com-
mittee" -i.e., by inserting a comma in the written text - so that the
reported passage reads as follows :31
"The Committee proceeded to the consideration of the following
amendment . . . proposed by the sub-committee, on the basis of
representation: 'Congress shall have power to make all laws neces-
sary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in each
State the same political rights and privileges, and to all persons in
every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property'."
By thus splitting off the final phrase, and relating it not to its proper
antecedent "sub-committee" but to the text of the Amendment which
followed, Conkling salvaged his case. The fact that intrinsically the
Bingham Amendment had nothing whatever to do with "the basis of
representation," that it thus belied Conkling's motivating phrase, was
probably not perceived by his listeners for the reason that this point
28. KENDRicK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 46.
29. CDONxLING'S ARGUmEwT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20.
30. KElNR c, op. cit. s pra note 4, at 54 (italics added).
31. See note 29, supra (italics in original).
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was inconsequential to his main argument, and that in the reading of
the text he laid great stress on Bingham's use of the word "persons,"
thus directing thought in other channels.
3. Turning now to Conkling's second proposition, one finds the evi-
dence almost as damaging. Again and again Conkling intimated that
the real reason Bingham and the Joint Committee used the term "per-
sons" instead of "citizens" had been to include corporations. Close ex-
amination not only fails to substantiate this statement but even provides
an alternative explanation. One discovers the word "persons" used in
numerous contexts which suggest that the real reason for preferring the
term to "citizens" was that the freedmen, as natural beings and former
slaves, were unquestionably to be regarded as "persons," whereas numer-
ous complications arose whenever one attempted to speak of them, or
even to define them, as "citizens." 32
Nowhere is this shown to better advantage than in a draft of an
amendment which Conkling himself sponsored,a and from which, with
rare audacity, he quoted in argument.3 "Whenever in any State," he
read, making clear that the text was his own, "civil or political rights
or privileges shall be denied or abridged on account of race or color,
all persons of such race or color shall be e.xcluded from the basis of
representation." One naturally wonders whether we do not have here a
clue to the intended scope of the term "persons," and to the fundamental
reason for choosing it."5 Surely the reference to "all persons of such
race or color" suggests an explanation quite as plausible as Conkling's.
It does not preclude the possibility of mixed or compound motives in
determining the use of the term; it simply cautions against assuming
32. Passages in the Journal (KEmNimCn, op. cit. supra note 4, at 42-44, resolution
of Mr. Williams and Mr. Conkling; at 50-51, report of sub-committee) indicate that
the Joint Committee, confronted early in its deliberations with the problem of how
best to refer to the Negroes, divided into two groups. The first group, led by Conk-
ling and Bingham, preferred to use the inclusive term "persons" throughout. The
second group, led by Stevens, preferred the narrower term "citizens" with an added
clause defining citizenship in such manner as to include Negroes. The dangers of
ambiguity in definition apparently weighed heavily in the minds of all, for when the
question finally came to a vote, the Bingham-Conkling form was adopted and Stevens
withdrew his motion. Id., at 52-53. It was not until much later, when the final
draft of the amendment was before the Senate, that the first sentence of Section 1,
which now defines citizenship, was added.
33. KmRNaicK, op. cit. msipra note 4, at 44.
34. CoNKLrG's AEGt,!EmNT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 16.
35. This view is strengthened when one discovers that on April 21, 1866 the Joint
Committee approved the following phraseology as a final draft of Section 1: "No
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil
rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Kmmmcw,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 83-85. Bingham's phraseology was finally substituted on
April 28, 1866, after some surprising reversals in voting. Id., at 105.
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that a single explanation is necessarily adequate and that other possi-
bilities may be ignored.3"
4. Doubtless the most impressive point made by Conkling, so far as
the Justices of the Supreme Court were concerned, was to the effect that
Bingham's Amendment, as originally reported by the sub-committee, used
the word "citizens" throughout; "persons," he emphasized by implica-
tion, appeared nowhere in the text." What gave real significance to this
point was that Conkling had earlier emphasized that the text as originally
introduced by Bingham, and ordered referred to the sub-committee, read,
"Congress shall have power . . . to secure to all persons equal protec-
tion in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." Recalling this em-
phasis, listeners could hardly have failed to have been impressed. For
not only did it follow that the sub-committee had stricken out, "persons"
and substituted "citizens" in this early draft of what eventually devel-
oped into the equal protection and due process clauses, but it followed
further, since in the ultimate form both clauses applied to "persons,"
that at some stage or other - Conkling did not say when, or touch
directly upon this point - the broader of the two terms had been rein-
stated. Obviously the mere fact of these successive deletions and inser-
tions justified a view that the Committee had framed these clauses care-
fully, with utmost discrimination. And Conkling's statement regarding
the joint stock companies provided a plausible reason.
To remove the underpinning from this part of the argument - and
virtually from Conkling's entire case- one has to say merely that neither
the sub-committee, nor anyone, at any time or under any circumstances,
so far as the historical record indicates, ever used the word "citizen" in
any draft of the equal protection or due process clauses. "Persons" was
the term used by Bingham ;38 "persons" was the term reported by the
sub-committee ;39 "persons" was the term discussed and approved by the
Committee as a whole.4" Conkling misquoted the Journal in his argu-
36. Further evidence which suggests that the word persons may not originally
have been used with any subtle or devious intent is found in the text of the Fessenden
resolution, supra note 26. It will be recalled that this resolution specified that "the rights
of all persons" must be "amply secured," but that it so specified only with regard to the
"insurgent States." This being the case, and in view of the advantages of referring
to Negroes as "persons," it seems gratuitous for Conkling to have asked with regard
to this resolution, why, if Fessenden intended only to "bespeak protection for the
black man of the South, he should choose these general, sweeping, if not inapt words."
One can never know with certainty whether Fessenden regarded corporations as "per-
sons" within the meaning of this resolution, but one rather marvels at Conkling's
audacity in intimating that Fessenden did.
37. See supra, note 20.
38. KENDRICK, op. cit. stpra note 4, at 46.
39. Id., at 51, 56.
40. Id., at 60-61, 82-107.
[Vol. 47 : 371382
THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY"
ment, and it is almost impossible to believe that he did not do this in-
tentionally. The reason is that he paused, repeated, and rhetorically under-
scored the misquoted word "citizen" so that the passage, as it appears
in the printed argument,41 reads as follows:
"Now come the independent article:
'Article -. Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary
and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every
State, the same political rights and privileges; and to all citizens
in every State'.
"I beg your Honors to remark that the term here employed was
'all citizens in every State' . . . 'equal protection in the enjoyment
of life, liberty, and property'."4 2
So long as the presumption must be strongly against a mere lapse on
Conkling's part, the question necessarily arises what he could obtain
by so bold a move. The reader must remember in this connection that
Conkling predicated his entire case on the distinction between the mean-
ing of the terms "citizen" and "person," and that the effect therefore
was immeasurably to strengthen his hand. Another aspect of the matter
is that it is questionable from a reading of the argument, particularly
from the standpoint of one hearing it delivered orally for the first time,
whether, in the passage immediately following, listeners may not have
received the impression that Conkling himself was responsible for the
substitution of the word "persons" for "citizens" in this embryo equal
protection-due process clause. The reason for this belief is that Conk-
ling went on to quote excerpts from the Journal which showed that he
had himself moved to substitute "persons" for "citizens" in one draft,43
and that he stated, but did not emphasize, that this motion to substitute
was really with reference to one of the earlier quoted articles relating to
representation and suffrage.44 The question, therefore, is whether his
41. P. 18.
42. It is sufficient to point out that the emphasis and underscoring eliminate the
possibility of a mere verbal slip on Conkling's part in substituting "citizens" for "persons:'
And this appears to leave but one alternative, the possibility that Conkling really
intended to emphasize the use of the word "citizens" in the first clause rather than
in the second. Yet a rereading of his text with this object in mind reveals the unlike-
lihood of such an explanation--if for no other reason than that it requires his making
not one verbal slip, but two, and that together these would have so altered his meaning
as to make their delivery and oversight appear improbable.
43. See supra note 19.
44. Article B as reported in the Journal. KEimnicK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 50-51.
Conkling had quoted Article B, and its alternative form, Article A, on pages 17-18
of his argument, but immediately after doing this he had also quoted Bingham's "inde-
pendent article." Confusion might very easily arise from failure to make clear that
his motion to substitute thus applied to Article B, particularly since its phraseology
was of little apparent interest.
1938]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
listeners - who must have been highly impressed by his dramatic under-
scoring of the misquoted word "citizens," and who were probably still
wondering when the word "persons" had eventually been reinstated -
did not jump to the conclusion, unwarranted by a close reading of the
argument, that Conkling was himself the man responsible for this change.
In view of these circumstances, it can be seen that Conkling undoubtedly
gained a great deal from this part of his argument. Whether, and to
what extent, his gains were the result of deliberate plan and artifice can
never be known with certainty - and one must recognize some of the
same pitfalls in imputing plot and design to Conkling as we have al-
ready mentioned in the case of Bingham 45 -but the present writer is
convinced that the foregoing evidence is most reasonably explained as
a deliberate misuse of facts. To say this is not to say that the Joint
Committee may not have regarded corporations as "persons ;" that, indeed,
is a question which depends upon many things. It is simply to say that
Conkling could not prove his proposition from the Journal itself. In
making the attempt, therefore, he resorted to misquotation and unfair
arrangement of facts. He made free use of inference and conjecture,
and above all he imposed upon the good faith of listeners who undoubt-
edly had a high regard for his veracity.
In summing up, it appears that the portions of Conkling's argument
which rest upon quotations from the Journal of the Joint Committee by
no means sustain the impressions he drew. The whole argument, in fact,
is found to be little better than a shell of inference built up in the course
of attempted proof of inconsequential points. Not one but both of his
major propositions collapse under weight of facts which he himself
cited. Misquotation, equivocal statements, and specious distinctions sug-
gest an inherently weak case - even point toward deliberate fabrication
of arguments. All in all, the showing is so poor that one is forced to
consider whether Conkling's personal reputation, and the advantage which
he enjoyed as the first member of the Joint Committee to produce and
make use of the Journal, did not account to large extent for his con-
temporary success, whereas the continued credence given his argument
has been the result of these factors plus the natural tendency for us
today to assume foresight in those matters which are reasonably clear
to hindsight, it being forgotten that as applied to historical interpreta-
tion this is often an unwarranted - even dangerous - assumption.
Practically, the only point in Conkling's argument not so far dis-
credited is his statement that "at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, joint stock companies were appealing for congressional and
45. There is the important difference, however, that Conkling undoubtedly had a
strong motive for misleading the Supreme Court, whereas the chief question must
always be whether Bingham had any motive for desiring to aid corporations.
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administrative protection against invidious and discriminating State and
local taxes. One instance was that of an express company whose stock
was owned largely by citizens of the State of New York . . .", This
is an explicit statement, and one which merits thorough investigation,
but it must be stressed that by itself it is scarcely adequate proof of
Conkling's point. Corporations may indeed have petitioned the Thirty-
ninth Congress for relief, but alone this fact proves little. Without direct,
contemporaneous evidence that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment devised its phraseology with corporations in mind, or at least with-
out evidence that they regarded it as benefiting corporations, once drafted,
the existence of these parallel occurrences may have been simply coinci-
dence -a coincidence which Conkling, arguing long after the event and
at a time when corporations were moving heaven and earth to broaden
judicial interpretation of "persons" and "due process of law," may have
shrewdly determined to capitalize. In view of the liberties he appears
to have taken with other facts, in view of his temptations to stretch the
record 4 7 and of his unique opportunities for doing so,4 8 above all, in
view of the dangers of relying upon purely circumstantial evidence to
establish intent in cases where intent presumes an exceptional viewpoint
and perspicacity, one is warranted, at least until it is proved that Bing-
ham had a substantive conception of due process, in regarding this
portion of Conkling's argument as essentially immaterial.
II. THE EVIDENCE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES
It becomes increasingly apparent that the conspiracy theory can hardly
attain satisfactory status until precise knowledge is had of what the
framers themselves conceived to be the meaning of the language they
employed. Conkling's argument and the circumstantial record of the
Journal prove inconclusive and therefore inadequate on this point. It
remains to assay the evidence which is found in the congressional debates
of 1866.
The impressive thing here, of course, is the utter lack of contempora-
neous discussion of these clauses which are today considered all-im-
portant. Hundreds of pages of speeches in the Congressional Globe
contain only the scantest reference to due process and equal protection.40
46. See supra note 22.
47. I.e., as a lawyer anxious to see the Supreme Court "liberalize" the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly to the extent of declaring corporations "persons."
48. L e., as a man high in public life relating inside history for the first time,
and bolstering his case--or shall we say his inferences-by citations from a manuscript
journal not heretofore known to exist.
49. Aside from the Bingham speeches cited supra in note 6, the most important
references to these clauses were in speeches by Reverdy Johnson, Democratic Senator
from Maryland and minority member of the Joint Committee [CONG. GLonE, 39th Cong.,
1938]
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Two opposing explanations will perhaps be offered in this connection.
Critics of the conspiracy theory will doubtless hold that dearth of dis-
cussion indicates a universal understanding that these clauses were to
protect the freedmen in their civil rights. Sponsors, on the other hand,
may argue that silence indicates a universal misunderstanding of what
were in fact the "real" purposes of the framers.
It is desirable because of this double-edged character of the argu-
ment from silence, and because of the peculiar dangers inherent in its
use as a proof of "conspiracy," that we digress a moment at this point in
order to avoid later confusion.
So long as intent or design is one major element in any conspiracy,
and so long as silence or secrecy is the other, it readily follows that if
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to benefit corpora-
tions, and yet failed to make known their intentions - which otherwise
were not suspected- then the framers were guilty of conspiracy. In
short, intent plus silence in a situation of this kind equals conspiracy.
When this formula is applied to the present case, it follows further,
since the fact of silence is not questioned,10 that the actual intent of the
drafters to afford corporations relief is the only point at issue. To prove
intent is to prove the conspiracy theory. But it is precisely at this point
that confusion arises. Since silence, along with intent, is one of the
1st Sess., (1866) 3041]; J. B. Henderson, Republican Senator from Missouri [id., at
3035-3036]; Jacob M. Howard, Republican Senator from Michigan and majority mem-
ber of the Joint Committee [Id., at 2766]. However, even these references are so
brief as to settle nothing. Reverdy Johnson favored the due process clause but opposed
the privileges and immunities clause "simply because I do not understand what will be
the effect of that," inferring, of course, that he thought he understood what was to
be the effect of due process. The only fragment of evidence in the Globe suggesting
that Johnson may have had a substantive conception of due process is that on one
occasion when debating the constitutionality of test oaths- i.e., not when discussing
due process-[CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 2916] he alluded to the Alabama
case In re Dorsey [7 Port. 293 at 296 (1838)] in which Justice Ormond had held
a duelling test oath to be a violation of the due course of law clause of the Alabama
Constitution. This would seem to be too slender a reference to serve to link these
two concepts.
The speech of Senator Henderson is more suggestive, particularly in the light of
our later discoveries regarding Bingham's views. Henderson obviously regarded the
whole of Section 1 as applying only to Negroes, for he criticized it as unnecessarily
prolix and declared that the whole problem would have been solved by a draft pro-
hibiting the States from discriminating against Negroes because of race or color.
However, he did regard "life, liberty, and property as absolute inalienable rights" and
was thus probably prepared to read into the clause his personal conceptions of justice
-even though his discussion implied that he regarded the due process phrase as properly
securing only notice and hearing, etc.
Howard's speech is consistent with a "Negro race interpretation" of Section 1.
50. That is, one searches the debates in Congress and in the ratifying legislatures
in vain for any intimation to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded
prospective relief to corporations.
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major elements of conspiracy, there is a natural tendency to use it not
only to prove the theory, but also, by a confusion of purposes and ideas,
to prove intent. This is done generally in the roundabout fashion of
assuming that silence is evidence of secrecy, and that secrecy in turn
is evidence of intent. It is hardly necessary to point out that this is a
chronic form of circular reasoning which amounts practically to using
the argument from silence as a screen to mask the assumption of what
one is really trying to prove. Logically, it is a pitfall which one must
take particular care to avoid. Intent to aid corporations must be proved
by satisfactory evidence and not derived or assumed from the mere fact
of silence.
Turning now to an examination of the evidence in the Globe, it can
be said that the speeches of Bingham 1 alone are really suggestive and
worthy of. analysis, although even they are found deficient in essential
particulars. Stripping Bingham's arguments down to their vital points,
one may list the following, particularly in their cumulative effect, as more
or less favorable to the conspiracy theory:
1. Bingham deemed it to be a grave weakness that the entire Bill of
Rights of the Federal Constitution and more particularly the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment applied only as a restraint upon Con-
gress. Holding citizenship to be national and denying, therefore, that the
States had ever rightfully been able to interfere with the privileges of
national citizenship - among which were the fundamental rights of life,
liberty and property 2 - Bingham's first consideration was to devise an
amendment which would remedy this defect.ra It can be said with assur-
ance that to do this was the general purpose of all his various drafts,
51. 'See supra note 6. It should be stated at this point that Bingham nowhere
defined what he meant by "due process of law." However, the following exchange tool:
place in the course of one of his speeches:
Mr. Rogers . . . "A question. I . . . wish to kmow what you mean by
'due process of law'."
Mr. Bingham, "I reply to the gentleman, the Courts have settled that
long ago; and the gentleman can go and read their decisions:'
CNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. (1866) 10S9.
One might say in 1937 that Bingham was somewhat deceived as to the "settled" char-
acter of his doctrine.
In the peroration of this same speech Bingham spoke of "due process of law-
law in the highest sense, that law which is the perfection of human reason, and which
is impartial, equal, exact justice; that justice which requires that every man shall
have his right; that justice which is the highest duty of nations as it is the imperishable
attribute of the God of nations."
52. A view which derived from Justice Washington's dictum in Corfield v. Coryell,
6 Fed. Cas. No. 3, 230 (E. D. Pa. 1823). See HowmL, PmvEs Aim ImX2mN-mTEs
oF STATE CrrIZENSHIP (1918) 19.
53. This point, which recurs in Binghar's speeches, is best developed in that of
Feb. 28, 1866, CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 10S9-1090.
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including the early forms which provided "Congress shall have power to
. . . secure to all persons in every State equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty and property." A desire to curb the States, to nationalize
fundamental rights, and to do this using the phraseology of the Fifth
Amendment, were the hubs around which Bingham's thinking revolved. 4
2. Bingham was emphatic at times in pointing out that the Fourteenth
Amendment did .not apply merely to the Southern States and to the
Negroes. "It is due to the Committee," he declared on one occasion5
when asked whether his draft "aimed simply and purely toward the
protection of American citizens of African descent," "that I say it is
proposed as well to protect the thousands and tens of thousands and
hundreds of thousands of loyal white citizens of the United States whose
property, by State legislation, has been wrested from them by confisca-
tion, and to protect them also against banishment . . . It is to apply to
other States also that have in their constitutions and laws today provi-
sions in direct violation of every.principle of our Constitution." Asked
at this point whether he referred to "the State of Indiana,"' 0 Bingham
replied, 7 "I do not know; it may be so. It applies unquestionably to the
State of Oregon." These allusions are obviously in harmony with 'some
explicit and definite purpose.
3. Likewise suggestive of catholic motive, and of one somewhat in
line with Conkling's claims, is the fact that Bingham on one occasion s
sounded out congressional sentiment in favor of an "added . . . pro-
vision that no State in this Union shall ever lay one cent of tax upon
the property or head of any loyal man for the purpose of paying tribute
and pensions to those who rendered service in the . . . atrocious rebel-
lion . . . I ask the gentlemen to consider that, as your Constitution
stands today, there is no power, express or implied, in this Government
to limit or restrain the general power of taxation in the States."
4. At one point in his argument Bingham referred,"' though very
casually, to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in "the
great Mississippi case of Slaughter and another." Unquestionably this
reference was to the slavery case of Groves v. Slaughter ° decided by the
Court in 1841. As such, it is a reference of great potential importance
for the reason that Justice Baldwin, an ardent defender of slavery,
anxious to place that institution beyond the control of both the States
54. For a more detailed analysis of the framers' purposes, see FLAcK, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 68-69, 81-82, 94-97.
55. Speech of Feb. 27, 1866. CONG. GLOBE (1866) 1064-1065.
56. Ibid. The question was put by Rep. Hale, Republican, New York.
57. Ibid.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 429.
59. Speech of Feb. 28, 1866, id., at 1094.
60. 15 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1841).
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and the Federal Government, had here, for the first time, used the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment as a means of restraining Con-
gress' power over slaves in interstate commerce."' Baldwin's opinion
thus applied due process in a definitely substantive sense, and it an-
ticipated by fifteen years Chief Justice Taney's similar application in
the case of Dred Scott.
A fact which seems to heighten the importance of Bingham's mention
of Groves v. Slaughter is that in a later part of his dictum Justice Bald-
win had used the comity clause (Article IV, Section 2) as the means
of withdrawing the slave traffic from State control.6 2 In short, Baldwin
used both of the identical clauses which Bingharp and the Joint Com-
mittee eventually included in Section One. The question necessarily arises,
therefore, whether Bingham may not have taken his cue from Baldwin
- whether, as a means of protecting all property, including of course
the property of (former) slaves, he did not deliberately build upon and
strengthen the No Man's Land wlhich Baldwin originally had created
for the protection of property in slaves. For a Radical Republican to
have done this would have constituted a great tactical triumph, in any
event, and one can readily see how, if Bingham actually sought to pro-
tect foreign corporations in the manner Conkling intimated, the stroke
would have amounted to positive genius. For, clearly, in addition to
strengthening the barriers of that No Man's Land which- according
to Justice Baldwin at least- existed in the original Constitution with
regard to property per se, Binghan created still another No Man's Land
which surrounded and protected the "persons" who owned property. He
did this simply by making the due process clause - one half of Baldwin's
original system of protection -itself a restraint upon both the Federal
Government and the States. "Persons" in consequence were thus secured
in their rights of property, against both Congress and local legislatures.
What is one to conclude from the discovery that John A. Bingham,
author and sponsor of the equal protection-due process phraseology,
(1) aimed to secure greater protection in the fundamental rights of
property; (2) intended to curb all states, including Oregon; (3) desired
an "added provision" limiting the taxing power; (4) cited a case wherein
substantive use had been made of due process to protect property rights;
(5) even used the identical clauses in Section One which Justice Baldwin
had used in this early substantive opinion?
The first point to note in answering this question is that only when
one places the most favorable interpretation upon each individual part
of the evidence does the whole, taken collectively, suggest that Bingham
61. Id., at 514. For the historical importance of this dictum, see Con~v, Cou-
xmERcE PowER vERsus STATES' RIGHTS (1936) 70-71.
62. 15 Pet. 514-516 (U. S. 1841).
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may have had the purpose which Conkling intimated in his argument.
A moment's examination, however, reveals numerous points at which
the evidence is inadequate to support these separate conclusions. Three
in particular may be cited:
1. Bingham simply declared himself in favor of an additional pro-
vision limiting the taxing power. One cannot determine from his
speeches whether he regarded his own draft as having the effect of limi-
tation or whether he simply meant to sound out sentiment in favor of a
draft which would have this effect.' Obviously one must not infer the
former motive from silence alone, without other evidence.
2. Bingham mentioned no particular opinion when referring to Grovcs
v. Slaughter;4 he simply inferred that the case had decided that "under
the Constitution the personal property of a citizen follows its owner,
and is entitled to be protected in the State into which he goes." While
these words might be construed as a reference to the comity clause por-
tion of the Baldwin dictum," the conservative course is to draw no con-
clusion from such meager circumstances.
3. It will be noted that Bingham justified his draft on the grounds
that it protected "loyal white citizens" and "any loyal man" as well as
Negroes. In short, his references are all to natural "persons," never to
artificial ones.6" Granted that a hidden motive would undoubtedly have
63. Bingham's only reference to the need for a curb on the taxing power was
made in a speech delivered January 25, 1866. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1866) 429. The day previous the Joint Committee had voted to remove the injunction
of secrecy [KENDRICK, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 56] in order that members might
"announce the substance and nature of the proposed amendment" in their speeches on
the floor. When this fact is kept in mind, the order and substance of Bingham's remarks
suggest that his speech was in the nature of a trial balloon designed to test the senti-
ment in the House.
64. Failure to mention an opinion is important for the reason that the Court in
this case split six ways, with four opinions. Baldwin alone mentioned due process.
See Swis E, ROGER BROOKE TANEY (1936) 396-399 and 2 WAmN, TiE SuPREm.
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923) 340-347, for details of this case which in
many respects was prophetic of the Dred Scott decision.
65. 15 Pet. 449, 515 (U.S. 1841).
66. Bingham's most explicit statement pertaining to the word "person" was made
in the course of a speech on the Civil Rights bill on March 9, 1866 [CoNG. GLoBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 1292]. Objecting that the bill as then drafted applied only to "citi-
zens," and therefore discriminated against aliens, Bingham declared: "The great men
who made that instrument, [the United States Constitution] when they undertook to
make provision, by limitations upon the power of this Government, for the security of
the universal rights of man, abolished the narrow and limited phrase of the old Magna
Charta of 500 years ago, which gave the protection of the laws only to 'free men'
and inserted in its stead the more comprehensive words 'no person'; thereby obeying
the higher law given by a voice out of heaven: 'Ye shall have the same law for the
stranger as for one of your own country'. Thus in respect to life and liberty and,
property, the people by their Constitution declared the equality of all men, and by
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impelled secrecy with reference to corporations, it is still true, as we
have already pointed out, that secrecy is not here admissible as a proof
of intent.
The chain of circumstances from which intent might be deduced thus
being broken at several points, it is plain that the evidence in Bingham's
speeches is not adequate proof of the conspiracy theory. It remains to
linger a moment at this point, however, in order to note several features
of his argument.
First of these features is a very important implication of his state-
ment that his phraseology was designed to protect, not merely Negroes,
but "the thousands . . . of loyal white citizens of the United States
whose property, by State legislation, has been wrested from them by
confiscation, and to protect them also against banislunent. It is to apply
to other States also that have in their constitutions and laws today pro-
visions in direct violation of'every principle of our Constitution."",
The fact that intrinsically this statement suggests that natural persons
were the only objects of Bingham's solicitude must not be permitted to
obscure the significance of the type of legislation which had offended
him. Laws enacted during and after the Rebellion by the eleven "rebel"
and apparently by a few "other States," laws which inflicted "banish-
ment" and "confiscation" upon "loyal white citizens" were the particular
objects of his ire. Such laws, in his judgment, violated "every principle
of our Constitution" and in giving Congress power to "secure to all
persons equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property," he
doubtless meant to extirpate these abuses.
The point which we here wish to stress is that this motivation practi-
cally assures- so long as Bingham appears to have associated "equal
protection" with "due process of law" -that he had a substantive con-
ception of due process. It is hardly conceivable, at any rate, that a
Radical Republican, outraged by acts of rebel confiscation -which he
regarded simultaneously as denials of equal protection and due process
of law - objected to this confiscatory legislation simply because it denied
such traditional requirements of due process as fair notice and hearing.
Inherently the circumstances suggest that it was the substance of such
legislation, not merely its effects upon the procedural rights of the ac-
express limitation forbade the Government of the United States from making any
discrimination.
"This bill, sir, . . . departs from that great law. The alien is not a citizen. You
propose to enact this law . . . in the interests of the freedmen. But do you propose
to allow these discriminations to be made in States against the alien and stranger?
Can such legislation be sustained by reason or conscience? . . . Is it not as unjust
as the unjust State legislation you seek to remedy? Your Constitution says 'no person,*
not 'no citizen: 'shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,' without due process
of law.'
67. See s'upra note 55.
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cused, that one invoking the clause would have attacked. Stated other-
wise, circumstances point to a "natural rights" usage, and a natural
rights usage is here obviously a substantive one."8
By a somewhat indirect and unexpected turn, one thus discovers evi-
dence which indicates that Bingham in 1866 probably did have a sub-
stantive conception of due process of law, and did, therefore, regard
the guarantee in a manner which was potentially of benefit to corpora-
tions. Paradoxically, however, the importance of this discovery is min-
imized, so far as its bearing on the conspiracy theory is concerned, by
its own implications. Bingham used due process in a natural rights sense.
He read into the clause his personal conceptions of right and justice.
But the very circumstances under which he did this point to the existence
of an intense and specific motivation which may very well have so ab-
sorbed his energies and interests that he gave little or no thought to
the auxiliary uses of his phraseology. If one adopts this view, Bingham
was a Radical Republican consumed by a determination to thwart those
"rebels" and Democrats who were inclined to vent their animosity by dis-
criminating against negroes, loyalists, "carpetbaggers," etc. He was a
crusading idealist, and it is an open question whether he was not, for this
reason alone, one of the persons least likely to ponder the needs and con-
stitutional status of corporations. A zealot is rarely so ambidexterous.
It is a merit of this simple discovery relating to Bingham's pur-
poses that it leads to an hypothesis which can be readily and profitably
checked. If Bingham regarded due process of law in a natural rights-
substantive sense; if he conceived certain laws enacted by rebel and
"other States" as violating "every principle of our Constitution," then
conceivably, he may have outlined his views in earlier speeches in Con-
gress. Particularly so long as the problems dealt with in these Recon-
struction debates are known to have extended far back in the pre-war
controversies over slavery, it is logical to expect that Bingham, a highly
articulate leader who served in Congress almost continuously beginning
in 1854, expressed himself freely on these matters, and that his speeches
thus record the evolution and content of his thinking. Obviously it is
an easy matter to inspect his speeches with an eye for clues to the origin,
development, and significance of his concepts of due process and equal
protection.
Bearing in mind the mystery of the declaration that his draft applied
"unquestionably to the State of Oregon," and bearing in mind also the
ambiguity of his allusions to the "great Mississippi case of Slaughter
and another," and to the need for curbing the taxing power of the States,
we can now make an investigation of this kind.
68. Confirmation of Bingham's substantive conception of due process is found in
his speech of March 9, 1866, on the Civil Rights Bill [see supra note 66] and in his
speech of Feb. 28, 1866 [see supra note 51].
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III. BINGHAM'S CONCEPTION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 1856-1866
Three major speeches are found which shed light on these important
matters. In 1856,"9 in 1857,70 and again in 1859,-1 Bingham outlined
views which not only clear up the obscurities we have noted in his later
speeches but which go far toward solving the deeper problems of his
motivation. Carefully checked, these three speeches reveal that Bingham
did in truth conceive of due process as a limitation upon the substance
of legislation- that he so conceived it as early as 1856. Yet they give
no indication that he regarded corporations as "persons," nor do they
indicate that his use of the due process clause was inspired by any solici-
tude for corporate rights. On the contrary, it appears that Bingham in
his third speech in 1859 cited the due process clause of both the Fifth
Amendment and the Northwest Ordinance, together with the comity
clause-in short, the very clauses which seven years later he used in
his final draft of Section One - as having been violated by a section in
the Oregon Constitution72 which provided:
"No free negro or mulatto not residing in the State at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution, shall ever come, reside, or be within
this State, or hold any real estate, or make any contract, or maintain
any suit therein . . . "
This evidence obviously suggests that free Negroes and mulattoes-
natural "persons," rather than corporations - were the original objects
of Bingham's solicitude. As his speeches and drafts in 1866 give evi-
dence of having been based upon his speech of 1859, the question neces-
sarily arises whether Negroes rather than corporations were still the
sole objects of his concern at the later date.
Read in their social and historical context, Bingham's speeches not
only reveal how he came to focus upon the due process clause, but how
he came to read into it this revolutionary substantive meaning. It was
on March 6, 1856- exactly one year before Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in the Dred Scott case- that Bingham, making his maiden
speech in the House,73 argued that laws recently enacted by the Kansas
69. CoxG. GLoBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (1856) Appendix, at 124.
70. CO G. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1857) Appendix, at 135-140.
71. CoNG. GLoBE, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1859) 931-985.
72. Article I, Section 35, Constitution of Sept. 18, 1857.
73. See supra note 69. The Kansas Territorial Legislature, dominated by the pro-
slavery forces and acting under a pro-slavery Constitution, had adopted verbatim the
drastic Missouri slave code which inter alia (quoting Bingham) made it a felony "for
any free person, by speaking or writing, to assert that persons have not the right to
hold slaves in said Territory." Bingham contended that these provisions abridged "the
freedom of speech and of the press as well as deprived persons of liberty without due
process of law." The text of the Kansas law is given in SF..'. Exc.m Doc., No. 23, 34th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1856) 604-606.
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(Shawnee Village) legislature, declaring it a felony even to agitate
against slavery, deprived "persons of liberty without due process of
law, or any process but that of brute force." As this speech was delivered
just two weeks after the Supreme Court's decision in the major case of
Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, 4 wherein counsel
in arguing procedural questions had cited such germinal substantive cases
as Hoke v. Henderson7' and Taylor v. Porter,"6 and wherein Justice
Curtis had distinguished in his opinion between legal process and due
process with regard to procedure,77 the presumption is that Bingham,
seeking for a constitutional clause on which to hang his political and
ethical opinions, appropriated Curtis' distinction and carried it over
from procedure to substance. The fact that the Kansas laws had simply
defined the felonies, and had not interfered with the procedural rights
of the accused, makes it plain that Bingham's citation could have been
made only in a substantive sense.78
The character and circumstances of Bingham's original application
of the due process clause raise the question of whether he could have
been the first - or among the first - to employ it as a weapon in the
slavery debates, and whether, accordingly, his action did not in some
manner determine the Republican Party's heavy reliance upon "due
process of law" just three months later in its platform of 1856.10 Satis-
factory answers to these two questions must necessarily wait a careful
search of voluminous records, but meanwhile several fragments of evi-
dence point in Bingham's direction: (1) Bingham was colleague and
protege of Joshua Giddings, abolitionist Congressman from Ohio who
in 1856 served as an influential member of the Republican platform
committee, and who drafted the planks in which the due process clause
74. 59 U. S. 272 (1856). This case was argued Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 4, 1856, and
decided Feb. 19, 1856.
75. 15 N. C. 1 (1833). Professor Corwin stresses the significance of this case
in his article cited supra note 14, at 383.
76. 4 Hill 140, 146 (N. Y. 1843). This case is famous as the first in which the New
York Courts began employing the due process clause of the State constitution as a
means for absorbing the doctrine of vested rights. See Corwin, Growth of Judicial
Review in New York (1917) 15 Micir. L. REV. 297.
77. 59 U. S. 272, at 276 (1856).
78. See Bingham's own paraphrasing of these in his speech. CONG. GLOBE, 34th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1856) Appendix, at 124. See supra note 73 for one example.
79. The plank on Slavery in the Territories, drafted with particular reference to
Kansas, declared that "our Republican Fathers, when they . . . abolished slavery in
all ...national Territory, ordained that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; it becomes our duty to maintain this provision
against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the Terri-
tories of the United States by positive legislation . . ." In a later passage the people
of Kansas were cited as having been "deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law." See PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIs? TnP.FE REPUBLIcAN CoNVNTioNs OF
1856, 1860, AND 1864 (1893) 43.
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appeared." (2) While Giddings is known to have made use of due
process in his speeches after 1856,"1 the writer has found no instance
of his having done so earlier, "2 thus suggesting that Bingham's usage
antedated Giddings', and that it may, therefore, even have inspired it.
(3) Philomen Bliss, another Republican and Ohio colleague of Bingham
in the 34th Congress, is known to have used the due process clause in
several speeches in 1856 and 1857,3 but in each instance it was after
a similar usage by Bingham. Bingham therefore is the earliest known
user, and this fact, together with his persistence, and the apparent ten-
dency for the early usage to center in the Ohio delegation, suggests that
he may well have been the evangel of due process in the modem sub-
stantive sense.
Evidence indicates that Bingham, having discovered due process of
law, explored it thoroughly, perceived something of its rhetorical possi-
bilities as a weapon in the anti-slavery debates, noted that it had been
included in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,4 and read into the vague
80. Id., at 22. Julian states, [THE L= OF JOSHUA R. GmDiXGs (1892) 335-6] "BY
far the most important part of the platform was written by Giddings in his library at
Jefferson and is here copied," and then quotes the entire plank relating to Slavery in
the Territories.
81. See CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Congress, 2d Sess., 346 (1859).
82. Giddings' SPEECHES iN CONGRESS, published in 1853, reveal that throughout
his long career as an Abolitionist leader in the House he relied on the Declaration of
Independence as a secondary constitution, citing the phrase "inalienable rights of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness" again and again. Yet no mention is found of due
process of law either in these speeches or in those between 1852 and 1856 in the Con-
gressional Globe.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (1856) Appendix, at 553-7. Spealdng two
and a half months after Bingham, and on the eve of the Republican convention, Bliss
leaned heavily on stock natural rights arguments, and cited the due process clause in
several places. Even more suggestive of Bingham's influence is Bliss' speech of Jan.
15, 1857 (two days after Bingham's speech of Jan. 13). CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1857) Appendix, at 145, 149. Here Bliss cited constitutional history and empha-
sized that the framers of the Bill of Rights substituted "person" for "freemen," etc.
See the speech of Rep. A. P. Granger of New York, [C.G. GLOBE, 34th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1856) Appendix, at 295-7] April 4, 1856, four weeks after Bingham's first
speech. This is the earliest known speech, aside from Bingham's, that employs due pro-
cess of law in argument and the only one which the writer has been able to find made
by a non-member of the Ohio delegation.
84. The significance of this fact is that Congress in organizing Territories and
passing enabling acts for the creation of new States frequently stipulated that these
new local constitutions be "not repugnant to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787." Thus
one could argue that while the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applied
only as a restraint upon Congress, the law of the land clause of the Northwest Ordi-
nance had nevertheless been made a restraint upon these particular States. This idea
seems to have been implicit (if not always clearly stated) in Bingham's arguments, and
it was apparently one means of his getting round the embarrassing features of John
Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore [7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833)]. The speech on
the President's Message in 1857 lays considerable stress on the Northwest Ordinance,
even quoting Taney's opinion in Strader v. Graham [10 How. 82 (U. S. 1850)].
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outlines of the phrase all the fervent idealism of a natural rights phil-
osophy. Thus, in his second speech,85 delivered on January 13, 1857,
(still six weeks before the Dred Scott decision) one finds him empha-
sizing repeatedly that the clause applies to all "persons," not merely to
all "citizens ;" that "it protects not only life and liberty, but also property,
the product of labor ;" that "it contemplates that no man shall be wrong-
fully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than his life." In this
speech also, Bingham alludes to the case of Groves v. Slaughter -albeit
to McLean's, not Baldwin's opinion ;8" and in it too he makes clear that
the "absolute equality of all and the equal protection of each" are the
great constitutional ideals of American government .and as such "ought
to be observed and enforced in the organization and admission of new
states." In point of fact, Bingham declared they were enforced: It was
for this very reason that "the Constitution . . . provides that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law," and that it made "no distinction either on account of complexion
or birth."
In short, this second speech, likewise made with reference to the power
of Congress to regulate slavery in the Territories, reveals a progressive
development of ideas and a more thorough study of Constitutional his-
tory.87 One concludes that while Bingham still applied the due process
clause only with reference to natural "persons," he none -the less increas-
ingly thought of it as extending protection in accordance with his views
of right and justice. Moreover, his political idealism, expressed in the
"equal protection" concept, and strongly infused with natural rights
philosophy, provided a reservoir of ethical and moral judgments which
85. See supra note 70.
86. Bingham's use of Justice McLean's opinion deserves comment. Having argued
that due process "contemplates that no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit
of his toil," Bingham had obviously laid himself open to exactly such use of the clause
as Chief Justice Taney (then engaged in writing his opinion) was presently to make
in the Dred Scott case. There is reason to believe that Bingham was conscious of this
weakness, for it was in this connection that he quoted McLean's opinion: slaves were
not property under the Constitution; "The character of property is given them by the
local law . . . the Constitution acts upon slaves as persons, and not as property." One
must immerse himself deeply in anti-slavery polemics to follow the logic of this dis-
tinction, but once the premises are granted, it is plain how due process was to be made
a bulwark for slaves and abolitionists, but not for their masters. The sole difficulty,
apparently, was that Chief justice Taney was not convinced.
87. Specifically it shows (1) a growing awareness that the due process clause
specified (a) "no person" and (b) "property" in addition to "life and liberty," (2) a
conviction that this meant "no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruits of his
toil," (3) a formulated concept of "equal protection"--the very phrase which Bing-
ham was later to use in the Fourteenth Amendment-as the lofty ideal of American
government, and as the corollary, if not merely the equivalent, of due process of law.
The genesis of the equal protection concept is of extraordinary interest, particularly in
view of its association with due process of law.
[Vol. 47 : 371
THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY"
one might logically expect to find their outlet through the due process
phrase.
It is exactly this tendency that one notes in Bingham's third speech, 3
delivered February 11, 1859, with reference to the above-quoted "no free
Negro or mulatto" clause in the Oregon Constitution. Seeking consti-
tutional sanction for his anti-slavery views, Binglam again and again
relied upon "natural and inherent rights," on "sacred rights . . as
universal and indestructible as the human race," on "equality of natural
rights," etc., as the cornerstone of his argument. Nor was this reliance
without profound significance. Again and again he maintained that
"these natural and inherent rights which belong to all men irrespective
of all conventional regulations are by this Constitution guaranteed by
the broad and comprehensive word 'person,' as contradistinguished from
the limited term 'citizen,' as in the Fifth Article of Amendments." '8
The due process clause, in short, was the repository of natural rights.
Adding to the significance of this natural rights usage of due process,
and illuminating the pressures that inspired it, is the fact that while
no other member of Congress appears to have used the clause as Bing-
ham did, a number nevertheless relied heavily on extra-Constitutional
natural rights arguments in defending or condemning the provision in
the Oregon Constitution,9" and at least one member attempted to use
the "Republican form of government" clause in exactly the manner which
Bingham used due process." Obviously these circumstances suggest that
Bingham's tendencies were in no way exceptional or extreme; he had
simply made a happier choice in his selection of weapons. Whereas
the "Republican form of government" wording was probably too am-
biguous to invite usage in such cases, the due process phraseology, con-
88. See supra note 71.
89. (Italics not in the original). It is impossible to determine from Bingham's speech
whether he was aware as yet of the decision in the case of Barron v. Baltimore [7
Pet 243 (U. S. 1833)] wherein John Marshall had declared the first eight amend-
ments to be restraints on the Federal Government, not on the States. In 1865 this
decision served as the cornerstone for Bingham's whole argument, and he cited Mar-
shall's opinion again and again. However, the fact that his speeches in the fifties all
concerned the constitutional rights of persons in the Territories, not in the States, and
the further fact that the Northwest Ordinance (with its law of the land clause) had
generally been made binding on the Territories at the time of their organization, may
partially explain Bingham's silence regarding the Barron decision at the earlier date.
He may simply have assumed that whatever the status of due process in the States,
the Northwest Ordinance clauses applied in the Territories.
90. See, e.g., the very interesting speech of Rep. Hoard [CoNG. GLODS, 35th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1859) 987] in which he said, "Is it not manifestly unjust to deny any free-
born American, guilty of no crime, the right of home in the land of his fathers? If it
is admitted, as I think it must be, that such denial is unjust, then it is unconstitutional"
Here surely is evidence of how strongly in need men were of some clause to give con-
stitutional sanction to their ethical and political opinions.
91. Id., at 952 (Rep. Granger).
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taining the all-embracing terms "life," "liberty," and "property," and
containing also the word "due," one synonym of which is "just," was
ideally suited both for application and expansion.
One finds in this third speech also an explicit and significant clue to
the type of protection which Bingham conceived. Who would be "bold
enough to deny," he demanded, "that all persons are equally entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and property; that no one
should be deprived of life or liberty but by punishment for crime; nor
his property, against his consent and without due compensation." "
This telescoping and virtual rewriting of the due process and just com-
pensation clauses necessarily afford valuable insight into Bingham's
mind. It is probably to be expected that anyone using these clauses in
a natural rights sense will use them loosely; yet three aspects of the
constitutional status of property as viewed by Bingham must be noted.
First, he deems it axiomatic that a man's property must not be taken
"without his consent;" property rights by his view are thus virtually
absolute. Second, and not altogether surprising in the light of this first
proposition, he omits all reference to the qualifying phrase that it is
really "for public use . . . " that property is not to be "taken without
just compensation." Third, in using "due" as a synonym for "just" in
the just compensation clause, it is reasonable to suppose that conversely
he may have used "just" as a synonym for "due" in the due process
clause; and very likely it was in this manner that a textual factor rein-
forced the natural rights factor in furthering his substantive conception
of due process. Stated somewhat differently, according to Bingham's
view, due process probably meant just process, and inherently, therefore,
it could never be limited simply to its procedural elements.
All in all, when one considers the scope and possible applications of
the phraseology construed in this manner, it is apparent that Bingham
from 1859 onward held views -whether he actually applied them or
not- which were potentially capable, to use the Beards' phrase, of
"taking in the whole range of national economy." Indeed his views are
in many respects so much like those expressed by the Justices of the
New York court in the revolutionary case of Wynehamer v. People in
1856 93 that one is led to speculate whether Bingham may not have been
92. Id., at 985. (Italics not in original). Here it will be noted that Bingham is
thinking (1) only of natural persons, who are, however, to be "equally" protected;
(2) of liberty in the physical rather than in the present-day sense.
93. 13 N. Y. 378, 391 (1856). To quote Professor Corwin's analysis: "The main
proposition of the decision in the Wynehamer case is that the legislature cannot destroy
by any method whatever, what by previous law was property." Op. cit. supra note 14,
at 468. Bingham obviously regarded this proposition as axiomatic; for who would deny




familiar with the dicta of those opinions. It seems significant at any
rate that his own views should so closely parallel those which others, else-
where, were applying to the defense of business interests then contending
against legislative regulation.
Two additional points must now be noted. The first is that judging
by the similarity of numerous passages of rhetoric and statements of
fact, the Oregon speech of 1859 appears to have served as an important
source and reference in the preparation of his arguments and drafts in
1866."4 This fact alone suggests a close link between the Fourteenth
Amendment phraseology and the Oregon "no free Negro and mulatto"
provision.
The second point, more or less implicit in foregoing quotations, is that
several times in the course of this argument in 1859 Bingham made
clear that he regarded the just compensation clause, no less than the due
process clause, as a bulwark of natural and "sacred rights which are
as universal and indestructible as the human race." The significance of
this fact will be apparent when one recalls that Bingham's attempt to
secure inclusion of a just compensation clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1866 has always been regarded as one of the strongest indica-
tions of an intent to aid business and corporations and thus to "take in
the whole range of national economy." Now, however, it develops that
he cited this same clause seven years earlier in the speech Which, as we
have just pointed out, appears to have been an important source of his
later remarks, and which was indubitably inspired by discriminations
against free Negroes and mulattoes.
Finally, perhaps the most significant thing about Bingham's Oregon
speech is that he here made use, in addition, of the comity clause in
order to guarantee the rights of the free Negroes and mulattoes." He
was able to do this because native-born Negroes and mulattoes, by his
comprehensive anti-slavery definitions of citizenship, were "citizens" as
well as "persons."96
94. Thus, in his Oregon speech in 1859 [CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 9321
Bingham quoted from Story, Rawls, Kent, and the Dred Scott opinions to bolster his
definitions of citizenship. In his first speech delivered on Jan. 25, 1866, he quoted these
identical references in the same order and connection. CONG. GLOun, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1866) at 430.
95. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. (1859) 934-5. Republicans used this clause
to attack the Oregon constitutional provisions. See, e.g., speeches by Reps. Granger
and Dawes. Id., at 952, 974.
96. Bingham protected free Negroes with the shield of citizenship, but like Lin-
coln and others of his party he did not at this date approve of granting Negroes equal-
ity of social and political privileges. He upheld the right of States to deny free Ne-
groes the franchise, but disclaimed the right to deny them residence, etc. The difference
in Bingham's mind was between political and natural rights: "All free persons . . .
born or domiciled in any free state of the Union are citizens of the United States; and
although not equal in respect of political rights, are equal in respect of natural rights."
Id., at 985.
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There were two important corollaries of this proposition so far as
Bingham was concerned. First was that those privileges and immunities
to which "citizens of each state" were entitled under the comity clause
of the Constitution, Bingham interpreted to be the "privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States;" so that the clause read:
"Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens (of the United States) in the several staies."' 7 This of
course was the very view which he held in 1866 and which is known
to have prompted insertion of the privileges and immunities clause in
Section One." Second, and more revealing as a clue to his later purpose
in drafting Section One, was that according to his view "amongst
these privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" were
"the rights of life and liberty and property and . . . due protection in
the enjoyment thereof.""0 Thus the due process clause and the comity
clause really guaranteed the same rights, but one applied to "citizens,"
the other to "persons." By using both clauses in this argument, and
likewise by using the phraseology of both clauses in the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, Bingham undoubtedly conceived that
he was affording double protection to the "800,000" free Negroes and
mulattoes from such discriminations as Oregon had put in her State
Constitution. The due process clause being the repository of the natural
rights of all "persons," and the comity clause the special repository of
the natural rights of certain "persons" who were also "citizens," it
can readily be seen that in theory Bingham had worked out an ingenious
though rather complex system of constitutional protection. 100
With these facts at hand it is now possible to formulate conclusions
regarding Bingham's purposes and to note their bearing on the conspir-
acy theory. The striking thing is of course that in laying the foundation
for conspiracy we have apparently destroyed the superstructure. Seeking
confirmation for the substantive character of Bingham's conception of
due process, we have really found confirmation -or apparent confirma-
tion- of Justice Miller's "one pervading purpose-Negro race" theory
of the phraseology of Section One.
97. Ibid. As pointed out supra [note 52]. Bingham's views derived from one possible
reading of Justice Washington's dictum in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3, 230
(E. D. Pa. 1823).
98. FLACK, op. cit. mipra note 4, at 84-87. See also speech of Senator Howard, a
member of the Joint Committee, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 2765-66.
99. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. (1866), 984.
100. With this insight into Bingham's reasoning, and into early Reptiblican consti-
tutional theory in general, one incfines to moderate the view recently expressed by Pro-
fessor Grant [The Natural Law Background of Due Process (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 56,
at 66] that Section One was "miserably drafted." "Too zealously drafted," would seem
the juster phrase; like many before and since, Bingham reckoned without the Supreme
Court.
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We have found this by discovering that every clause which Bingham
used in his drafts in 1866 really dated back from seven to ten years in
his speeches,1"1 and was identified, originally, with the problem of slavery
in the Territories and with the controversial question of the citizenship
of free Negroes and mulattoes. State and territorial provisions denying
these last-mentioned "persons" the privileges of residence, and of ac-
quiring property and making contracts, provided Bingham with what may
have been merely an apparent economic motivation.
An anti-slavery polemist of the natural rights school, a man who
held thoroughly Lockian views concerning the sanctity of property and
the rights of all men to acquire it, Bingham hit fortuitously upon due
process in 1856 and used the weapon first to protect the "liberty" of
abolitionists, then to bolster Congress' power over slavery in the Terri-
tories. Chief Justice Taney's application of the same clause with reverse
effect in the case of Dred Scott presumably intensified Bingham's con-
victions and led him farther afield. Eventually the Oregon discrimina-
tions caused him to use due process to guarantee to free Negroes as
"persons" the very rights which Taney had guaranteed to slave holders
as "persons." To clinch this protection, and doubtless to pay his respects
to the aged Chief Justice, Bingham maintained that native born Negroes
were not only "persons," but "citizens," and not only "citizens," but
"citizens of the United States," and as such entitled to be protected by
Congress in the enjoyment of their rights of life, liberty and property.
Four observations may now be listed:
1. Apart from its direct bearing on the conspiracy theory, this evi-
dence illuminates the forces which brought about a revolutionary ex-
pansion of due process in America. The strong natural rights strain in
our political thinking,1 2 and the Lockian view of property as sacred
and absolute,10 3 have often been emphasized in this connection. To these,
apparently, should be added the intrinsic advantages of the due process
phraseology itself and the role of the slavery debates in acting as a
powerful flux in welding together these diverse elements. The irre-
sistible urge to find constitutional sanction for ethical and political opin-
ions relating to slavery led both sides to employ the clause in a substantive
sense. Perhaps but for the boomerang effect of Taney's usage in the
Dred Scott case, due process might have undergone a much earlier
and more rapid expansion.
101. That is, the comity, due process, equal protection, and just compensation forms
were all employed in these early debates. They were likewise employed in the various
drafts of Section One, the just compensation clause unsuccessfully. See supra note &
102. See particularly Grant, loc. cit. supra note 100; and for an exhaustlve general
treatment see HA -Es, THE REVIVAL OF NArunA LAw CoNcaers (1930).
103. Hamilton, Property-According to Locke (1932) 41 YA,. LJ. 864.
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2. A natural rights philosophy and an aversion to the spread of
slavery, rather than any profound insight into the potentialities of due
process, apparently provided the driving force in Bingham's usage. So
far as one can judge he was originally a zealot, not a schemer, an
antagonist of slavery, not a protagonist of due process and judicial
review. The indications are even that like many polemists he was singu-
larly blind to the broader implications of his stand; for during these
years he was one of the sternest critics of the Supreme Court1" 4 and at
the same time the advocate of doctrines which implied a tremendous
expansion of its powers. Taken alone, this fact is obviously hard to
reconcile with the view that an anti-democratic philosophy and a desire
to curb popular control of property in general lay deep in Bingham's
consciousness.
3. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment may be explained in its
entirety by assuming that Bingham's purposes in 1866 were similar to
his purposes in 1859. Phraseology which has heretofore been abstruse,
mysterious, "cabalistic," is thus rendered plausible without imputing to
Bingham a desire to include corporations or to "take in the whole range
of national economy."
4. While this is true, one must recognize that Bingham's views of
"property" and "due process of law" were such that it would have been
perfectly natural for him, had occasion ever arisen, to have applied that
guarantee to protect the property of corporations. The fact that as a
lawyer he spoke and thought of corporations as legal "persons" and
that in professional practice he was concerned with their protection, only
makes this possibility the more real.
CONCLUSION
If these facts point to no positive conclusion, they do at least permit
one to define more accurately the possible limits of "conspiracy" and to
restate its essential conditions.
Stated as concisely as possible, the question henceforth would seem
to be whether Bingham in the seven years between 1859 and 1866 came
to realize the full potentialities of his doctrine or whether he continued
merely to apply it in defense of free Negroes and mulattoes. Phrase-
ologically the system of constitutional protection he had invoked with
reference to the property rights and earning power of Negroes was
equally applicable to the protection of the property rights and earning
power of corporations. 05 Did his zeal as an enemy of slavery and as
104. See his speech on President Buchanan's Message, wherein he denied that the
Supreme Court was "the final arbiter on all questions of political power." [CoNG, GLOUP,
36th Cong., 1st Sess. (1860) 1839]. See also 3 Warren, op. cit. supra note 64, at 171, 189.
105. It is of particular interest to note how the chance provisions of the Oregon
Constitution barring Negroes from owning property and making contracts led Bing-
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a defender of the Union prevent him from seeing this fact? Did it
blind him to the needs and interests of corporations? Or did his neo-
Lockian fervor in behalf of the rights of property - all property, except-
ing that in slaves - awaken him to the possibility that corporations,
since they were "persons" in common legal parlance, might also be "per-
sons" within the meaning of the due process clause? Did Bingham come
to extend to corporations - or to shareholders - the same substantive
protection he extended to Negroes? In short, did Bingham's views
remain static during these years? Or did they prove as flexible and
dynamic as during the Fifties? Did the Civil War, which raised a host
of problems relating to business and corporations, direct attention to
such matters; or did it obscure and crowd out their consideration? The
alternative possibilities here balance one another so nicely that even
speculation is difficult; yet obviously these are the terms upon which
future decision must rest. The charge of "conspiracy" can eventually
be maintained only if it is shown that some force or influence caused
Bingham to broaden his application of the clause to include corpora-
tions - either sometime prior to 1866, or while the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was before the Joint Cbmmittee. Evidence bearing upon these
possibilities the writer proposes to review at a later date.
ham into a fundamentally laissez faire usage of due process which anticipated the deci-
sions in Allgeyer v. Louisiana [165 U. S. 578 (1897)] and Smyth v. Ames E169 U. S.
466 (1898)] by nearly forty years.
